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CASE COMMENTS
AUCTIoNS AND AUCTIONEERS-WHERE OWNER ELECTED TO SToP SALE
TO )PREVENT SACBIFICE, LIABILITY TO AUCTIONEER WAS LimrTED TO Vx-

PENSES INCURRED AND REASONABLE

ComPENSATIo

FOR AucTioNEErs

S=.i cus.-Appellant, owner of certain realty, contracted with appellee
to put Into. his hands said realty for public auction, promising- to pay
him, 25% of sales price, commission. Appellant contracted with appellee
that the land would be sold on day of sale, regardless of price offered.
On day of sale, after one lot had been bid in by appellant, to avoid sacrifice, and a second one, valued at $3,000, had been climaxed' at $900,
appellant, through her attorney, withdrew the property publicly. Appellee, notwithstanding this fact, after exhibiting his. contract to the
spectators and bidders, continued the auction. Appellant refused to
convey the prpperty. Appellee sued for commission on anticipated
sales price. Held: that appellant's withdrawal did not subject her to
payment of the commission; that where an owner's property is selling
at a sacrifice it may be withdrawn any time before the hammer falls,
or the bid Is accepted, (though the contract with the auctioneer was to
sell at the highest bid) and the auctioneer's compensation will be limited to expenses incurred plus reasonable pay for personal services.
Becker v. Urabb, 223 Ky. 549, 4 (2nd) S.W. 1050.
It does not appear that the Kentucky court had been donfronted
with this precise question prior to this time. But there Is authority
in other jurisdictions for the conclusion reacted. The Louisiana court,
in Girardy v. Stone, 24 La. Ann. 286, upon very similar facts, adopted
the rule. There the owner of property, who, after contracting with an
auctioneer and before date of sale, sold said property privately, was
held not to be liable for commission upon sales price, but only for expenses incurred. Kolb v. Bennett, 74 Miss. 888, 21 So. 223; Taylor v.
Barlow, 90 Miss. 888, 44 So. 998, are adequate to' show the Mississippi
court to be in accord with the Kentucky view.
The Minnesota court went farther than the Kentucky court in
Stensgoard v. Smith, 43 Minn. 11, 44 N. W. 669. It appeared that defendant had contracted with plaintiff to give him exclusive agency of
certain property for three months, and a commission for making a sale.
The plaintiff endeavored to make such sale, published advertisements,
solicited purchasers, but one month after making the offer the defendant himself sold the property. It was held that the plaintiff had no
cause of action.
Until the hammer falls and bid is accepted, a locus poenitentiae
remains, and the seller may withdraw property from sale (even though
the condition of the offer Is that it will not be.withdrawn) without
obligation. Tillman v. Dunn, 114 Ga. 406, 40 S. E. 244; Williston on
Contracts, Vol. I, Sec. 30.
Thus it can be seen that, in the principal case, since the appellant's
consideration for payment of commission was the consummation of the
sale )f said property, by appellee; the sfle having failed, the considera-
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tion failed-which is fatal to any contract. Hence, the positfon of the
court can be justified upon a, strict contract basis, if there were no
precedent.
Though there is limited authority upon the precisa question, rained
the conclusion is supported by the holdings available Too, the result
seems sound in principle, public policy, and is equitable in C.its relief.

S. Id

CoNsTITUTIONAL LA.w-No CouR HAS PowER TO REVmw A owto or
GovE=Non n GnrmnG A PARwo.-Tke petitioner was duly convicted
of a felony in the circuit court, but before judgment was entered, he
was granted a full and complete pardon by the governor of the commonwealth. Upon 'discovering that the petitioner's name had been misspelled in this pardon, the governo'r at once executed another in which
the name was correctly spelled. The court refused to recognize this
second pardpn on the ground that the governor had exiausted his
power by issuing the first, and was therefore without authority to grant
another. Held,: No court has power to review the action of the governor in granting a pardon. Jackson v. Rore, Judge, 223 Ky. 285, 3
(2nd). S. W. 641.
In our system of government it is elementary that the courts cannot interfere with executive action in any case where an executive
officer is authorized to exercise judgment or discretion in the performance of an official act. Taylor v. KerchevaZ, 82 Fed.' 497.
The three departments of our goyernment are co-ordinate, having
their powers alike limited and defined by the constitution. Each is/of
equal dignity and W7ithin their respeetive 6pheres of action equally independent and exclusive, in respect to the duties assigned. The pardoning power is vested in the executivedepartment and even a flagrant
abuse of it does not authorize the courts to decline to give full effect to
a pardon, which is regular on its face. To permit such action by the
courts would be an exercise by them, at least in part, of the pardoning
power which Is clearly an usurpation of authority. Ex parte Crump,
10 Okla. Cr. 133, 135 P. 428, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1036. The granting of
a pardon, in its final analysis, is wholly within the discretion of the
governor since he is clothed with this power by hte constitution. Ibid.
In State ex rel. Rawlinson v. Ansel, 76 S. C. 395, 57 S. E. 185, 11
Ann. Cas. 613, the court says, "All the authorities agree that in the
exercise of a discretionary official act an executive officer cannot be
restrained, coerced, or controlled by the judicial department."
It has been repeatedly held that the courts have no inherent authority to indefinitely suspend the execution of a sentence because this
is in effect an exercise of the pardoning power which is vested in the
executive department. Vernon v. htate, 79 So. 316; People v. Brown,
54 Mich. 15, 19 N. W. 571; State v. os8, 80 Iowa 467, 45 1. W. 898;
ex parte Bugg, 163 Mo. App., 44, 145 S. W. 831.
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In the light of the cases examined, the courts seem unanimously
agreed that the granting of pardons is purely an executive function.
The court was therefore, in the instant case, using the only means at
its command to curb the judiciary in what was clearly an attempted
J. C. B.
usurpation of executive authority.
CORPORTIONS-PROPERTY HELD BY ConRoATION AT DissoLTTIo.
VESTS IN STOCKHOLDERS, SUBJECT TO CORPORATE LiABLiTiEs.-A corporation acquired certain oil leases. Its corporate charter expired in 1914.
There were no corporate liabilities and the names and addresses of the
stockholders were unknown. Three of the stockholders brought suit
against one other stockholder to cause the property to be sold and the
proceeds divided among the stockholders. Held: On dissolution of a
business corporation, its property vests in the stockholders, subject to
the payment of corporate liabilities. ghadoin v. Sellars et al., 223 Ky.
751, 4 (2nd) S. W. 717.
A brief review of the history and development of the rule in question may be found in the leading case of Huber v. Martin, 127 Wis.
412, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 653. There the court said: "We are cited to the
supposed rule of the common law that, upon the termination of a corporation, its real estate reverts to the grantor and its personalty to the
American
sovereign, and that its debts become extinguished .......
courts have, except In a very few instances, never reognized the doctrine, and quite recently it was held by the Court of Queen's Bench in
Bankruptcy that it never had any place in the common law of England.
. .
We may safely close this branch of the case by saying that,
aside from dicta here and there, in the whole not worthy of serious
consideration, there is no legitimate support anywhere for the rule that
the property of a business corporation, upon its termination and the
payment of its debts, goes otherwise than to Its membres, if it has members to take."
The rule adopted in the principal case Is one that has been unanimously followed in previous Kentucky decisions. Ewald Iron Co. v.
Commonwealth, 140 Ky. 692, 131 S. W. 774; Young v. Fitch, 181 Ky. 29,
206 S. W. 29; Neptune Fire Engine and Hose Co. v. Board of Edcation
of Mason County, 166 Ky. 1, 178 S. W. 1138. This rule also represents
the decided weight of authority in other jurisdictions throughout the
United States. Rossi v. Claire, 174 Cal. 74, 161 Pac. 1161; Hightower
-v. Thornton, 8 Ga. 486, 52 Am. Dec. 412; Muncie, etc., Tract. Co. v. Citizen's Gas, etc., Min. Co., 179 Ind. 322, 100 N. E. 65; Root v. Wear, 98
Kan. 234, 157 Pac. 1181; Hopkins v. Crossley, 138 Mich. 561, 191 N. W.
822; Huber v. Martin, supra.
James Greenwood, Appt., v. Union Freight R. R. Co., 105 U. S. 13,
26 L. Ed. 961, was a case which went to the Supreme Court of the
United SItates to determine the rights of the shareholders of a corporation after the legislature had repealed the act of Incorporation. In
that case the court said, "that where the legislature repealed an act of
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Incorporation that the rights of the shareholders to the real and personal property acquired by the corporation, and rights of contract and
choses in action, are not destroyed by such repeal and if the legislature
has provided no specific mode of enforcing and protecting such rights,
the courts will do so by the means within their powee."
At present there are four modes of dissolution of corporations in
Kentucky. (1) By act of legislature, (2) by death of all the members,
(3) by forfeiture of the franchise, (4) by surrender of the charter or
voluntary dissolution. Byers, Law of Kentucky Corporations; Economy
Bldg. d Loan Ass'n v. ParisIce Mfg. Co., 113 Ky. 246, 68 S. W. 21. After
the expiration of the corporate charter, a corporation is fully authorized
to act, though only for the purposes of closing up its business. Kentucky Statutes, Sec. 561 (Acts of 1893, Ch. 171, Sec. 24). In interpreting the above act it was held that no specific mode was prescribed nor
was one at all desirable. Knott v. Evening Post Co., 124 Fed. 342.
That the result in the principal case with regard to this point is
both just and logical, is evidenced not only by a long line of authorities
C. E. B.
but by the fact that there is little, if any, conflict.
CRIMINAL
EXAMINATION

LAW-PERTNENT
OF NON-EXPERT

DEMONSTRABLE

WITNESSES

FACTS,

ON TEcmIcAL

DEVELOPED

BY

SUBJECT

ARE

CoPETET.-Defendant was convicted of the murder and robbery of
D. The defendant sought a reversal on the ground that the court had
erred in allowing the Commonwealth to introduce certain evidence. The
Commonwealth introduced two witnesses, one a former jailer and the
other the present jailer, who had had experience in the handling of
firearms and had studied various catalogues. Through the testimony
of these witnesses it was proved beyond a doubt that the bullet taken
from D.'s head had been fired from the pistol found on the defendant
when he was arrested. This proof was secured through certain magnifying tests on the technicality of the pistol. Held: Pertinent, demonstrable facts, developed by examination of non-expert witnesses on
technical subject are competent, though witnesses' conclusions are inadmissible. Jack v. Commonwealth, 222 Ky. 546, 1 S. W. (2nd) 962.
The principle invblved in the instant case is a comparatively new
one. In Wise v. State, 11 Ala. App. 72, 66 S. 128 it was held that a witness who is not qualified by experience and study in the particular matter Inquired about cannot testify as an expert. A witness who has had
experience in the handling of firearms and cartridges may testify as to
their nature, condition, and use including such matters as their size,
calibre, carrying and scattering capacity, and to the number of times
of firing. Jackson v. U. S., 102 Fed. 473; Garner v. State, 6 Ga.App.
788, 65 S. E. 842; State v. Legster, 71 N. J. L. 586, 60 Atl. 361. But in
the case under consideration the witnesses who were non-expert, were
allowed to give pertinent and demonstrable facts concerning the technicality of the gun. The principle being discussed seems reconcilable,
because, at the time the witnesses gave their testimony, they had studied
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and eperimented with the gun. In recent years much study and research hage been devoted to ballistics, and it has been shown by experiment and study that the rifles in the barrel will make the same. impressions on the bullets, and these can be plainly seen by using a properly
constituted microscope. There. is no reason Why the witnesses in ques
tion should not give in evidence their experiments. However, the witnesses have no right to draw their inferences; this- is for the jury.
Although this is a new principle in the law, it has been adopted in
many of the jurisdictions. It was held in Feree v. Commonwealth, 193
Ky. 347, 236 S. 'W; 246, that before a non-expert witness can be allowed
to express fn opinion as to the mental condition of ,a defendant in a
criminal prosecution, he must state facts sufficient to show that he had
opportunity to see, observe, and to form an opinion as to the mental
PtaLus of the' defendant, and even then his opinion is not of so much
value, as evidence, as thp facts upon which it is based. A thorough
search of the authorities failed to disclose other cases. In a recent case
it was laid down by the Supreme Court of Nebraska in Williams v.
State, 212 N. W. 606, that a physician's opinion as to the capacity to
commit crime, in response to a hypothetical question, may be rebutted
by evidence as to facts by non-expert witnesses; evidence of non-expert
witnesses, rebutting opinion of physician, based on hypothetical question, as to mental capacity to commit crime, may justify finding of defendant's legal responsibility. Trial of offenses under the Eighteenth
Amendment has been a stimulus to the extension of the principle.
Chemical analysis of liquor for purpose of proving its Intoxicating
character is not the exclusive method. of ascertaining such a fact. It
may be established by non-expert opinion of those accustomed to drink
liquor and acquainted with various kinds of liquors. State v. Snyder,
.227 Plac. 613; State v. Abraham, 158 La. 1021, 105 S. 50; Stoeoke v. U. S.,
1 Fed. (2nd) 612; Panev. U. S., 2 Fed. (2nd) 855.
W. C. W.

CRIATINAL LAV[-ImzROPER

QUESTION

OF COITMONWEALTH

ATTORNEY

IN MIURDER CASE, RESPECTING How MANY PERsoNs DEFENDANT HAS SHOT,
HELD

NOT

REVESIBLE WHEN OBJECTION WAS IMMEDIATELY SUSTAINED,

TIlE PpEsumrTioN BEING THAT THE JURY WAS GOVERNED BY THE RuLING

OF THE CounT.-The appellant was convicted of manslaughter.

There
was a motion for new trial on the ground of alleged misconduct of the
Commonwealth's attorney in asking appellant how many persons he had
shot in the last five years. Appellant's objection to this question Was
immediately sustained. Held, that reversal was not required, presumption being that the jury was governed by ruling sustaining objection to
improper question and was not influenced by Such question. Walton v.
Commonwealth, 223 Ky. 393, 3 S. W. (2nd) 764.
It is a well-established rule that a defendant cannot be prejudiced
In the trial of his case by intimation that he was formerly convicted, of
other offenses. Hall v. United States, 150 U. S. 76. In the case at hand

CASE COMMENTS
the court found that the misconduct of the attorney was not such as to
prejudice the rights of the appellant, since the objection to his question
was promptly sustained.
This decision seems to be in accord with the authorities and supported by logic. Unless the misconduct of the prosecuting attorney is
so prejudicial that it is obvious that the error is not cured by the
court's action in sustaining objection, or reprimanding thie attorney,
such actidn is sufficient to render it harmless. Carroll v. United States,
154 Fed. 425; Ammerman v. United States, 185 Fed. 1.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals has previously upheld this doctrine. In Baker v. Commonwealth, 210 Ky. 524, 276 S. W. 550, the defendant admitted on cross-exdmination that h6 had served a term in
prison and was asked to name the charge on which he was convicted.
The court sustained an objection to the question and admonished the
jury that they would not consider such evidence as affecting the guilt
of defendant. The court held this was not a reversible error since it
could not be presumed the jury disregarded instructions. That decision differs from the principal case in that the court admonished the
jury not to consider the evidence. However, it does not appear that
such admonition was requested, and in absence of request the court
need not admonish the jury not to consider a question to which objection is sustained. Fenley Model Dairy v. Secuskie, 218 Ky. 59, 290 S.
W. 1044.
However, in some cases courts have held that such questions or
remarks would prejudice the jury in spite of instruction. A statement
as to former murders committed by defendant was held ground for reversal notwithstanding verbal instruction to the jury not to consider
the argument in Wilson v. State, 95 Tex. C. R. 620, 255 S. W. 627. Remarks of the prosecuting attorney describing defendant and his witnes~es as bootleggers and liars was held reversible error and not cured
by instruction to consider only law and facts. Jones v. Commonwealth,
213 Ky. 356, 281 S. W. 164. The misconduct of the commonwealth's
attorney was so gross as to call for a sharp reprimand and the instructhe defendant.
tion! did not ufficiently $rotect
In the instant case the question was not so prejudicial as the
remarks in the cases just cited, and the court's action in sustaining
the objection to it was sufficient to correct it. Other cases in accord
with the principal case are: State v. Lee, 95 Iowa' 427, 64 N. W. 284;
Copeland v. United States, 2 F. (2nd) 637; People v. Garcia,Cal. App.,
E. T.
256, Pac: 876.
CRIMINAL

LA. --- UnoR's STATEMENT

HE DID

NOT

WAIftITO TRY DE-

ZENDANT FOR MALICIOUS SHOOTING UNLESS PROOF CALLED PR

LIrE SEN-

,rENcE, HELD No EVIDENCE OF PEjumicE.-Defendant had been convicted

under section 1166 Kentucky Statutes and the habitual criminal statute (section 1130), and had been sentenced to life imprisonment for
malicious shooting and wounding. After verdict, defendant made a

58.
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motion for a mew trial, which was overruled. On appeal, several rulings of tle trial court were objected to-one of them a remark made by
a juror before trial, that he would not want to try this defendant unless
he had a case that would send him to the penitentiary for life, because
he had such a temper he would probably kill the members of the jury
who tried him. Defendant contends that this was prejudicial to his
case and a new trial should have been given. Held, that this was no
evidence of prejudice to make a new trial necessary. Mills v. Commonwealth, 223 Ky. 165, 3 S. W. (2nd) 183.
Where it can be shown that the remarks of a juror before trial
have been prejudicial to defendant's cause, a new trial will be given.
However, remarks made by jurors which may indicate bias, are not of
themselves conclusive grounds for a new trial. Elliott v. Commonwealth, 154 Ky. 696, 159 S. W. 534; Chilton v. Commonwealth, 170 Ky.
491, 186 S. W. 191. An opinion expressed by a juror, in order to be
oblected to as prejudicial to defendant's case must be a fixed, deliberate and determined one, which can not be overcome by the evidence.
Gleason v. Commonwealth, 145 Ky. 128, 140 S. W. 63, Ann. Cas. 1913B
757. A transient opinion or expression does not disqualify a juror
where the juror believes such Impressions will disappear before the
evidence. Myers v. State, 97 Ga. 76, 25 S. E. 252.
The defendant is not permitted to assign prejudicial statements of
jurors as error after the case has gone to trial, where he knows of the
Juror's statements or does not avail himself of the means of determining if he is so prejudiced before trial. Collins v. State, 20 Ark. 28. The
expression of an opinion by a juror before trial concerning the guilt
or innocence of accused, although good grounds for challenge, Is not
good grounds for a new trial. Smith v. State, 59 Ark. 132, 26 S. W. 712,
43 Am. St. Rep. 20; Unitec States v. Baker, 3 Ben. 68; Bloodworth v.
State, 65 Tenn. 614, 32 Am. Rep. 546.
The court remarked In the principal case that the expressions of
the juror would not Indicate prejudice against defendant in the first
instance, but that it would rather indicate that he was afraid of defendant, and fear would have the tendency to induce the juror to seek
some means of acquitting accused, In order to avoid his wrath.
H. C. C.
ELECTRICITY-CLOSING

AN

AUTOMATIC

SWITCH

THROWN

OUT

BY

BREAKING ELECTRIC WIRE WITHOUT INVEsTIGATIOx, HELD NOT ACTIONABLE

NEGLGENCE.-Appellee, the deceased's administrator, averred that his
intestate's death occurred because of the negligence of appellant's agent
who turned on the electric current without heeding the warning given by
the automatic opening of the switch. Held, "that since the evidence in
these cases showed without contradiction that re-closing the switch In
such or similar circumstances Is a proper practice and Is so recognized
by 'all those engaged In same or similar business, we are constrained
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to hold that the re-closing of the switch by appellant's agent was not
negligence." Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Woolrum's Adm'r., 224 Ky. 33,
5 (2nd) S. W. 283.
It has been often held in the Kentucky court that one engaged in
the generation or distribution of electricity must exercise the highest
degree of skill and care known in the operation of its business to prevent injury to persons at any place where they might have a right to
be for either business Qr pleasure. Smith's A(mrx v. Middlesboro Blectric Company, 164 Ky. 46, 174 S. W. 773; Paducah Light and Power
Company v. Parkman's Adm'r, 156 Ky. 197, 160 S. W. 931; Lexington
Railway Company v. Fain, 24 Ky. Law Rep. 1443, 71 S. W. 623.
It is also well established in Kentucky that where specific negligence is pleaded, proof of general negligence is not admissible. Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Cash's Admr'x, 221 Ky. 655, 299
S. W. 590. It is conceded that the conclusion in the instant case is
sound and proper, but it would not have been so, according to Kentucky
Law, had the case been decided upon the act of appellant's agent in reenergizing the broken wire.
In order to establish a case of negligence the defendant must owe
the plaintiff a duty and neglect to act or act so as not to breach that
duty. Arkansas Telephone Company v. Ratteree, 57 Ark. 429, 21 S.
W. 1059; Jonds v. Union Railroad Company, 18 N. Y. App. Div. 267, 46
N. Y. Supp. 321.
The court in the particular case relied upon the specific facts presented. The result seems to cut in on the general rule holding generators and distributors of electricity to the highest degree of care possible
under the circumstances.
C. S. M.
EINENT

DOMAIN-MUNIC!PALITY

CANNOT

CHANGE

ESTAbLISUED

SIREET GRADE WITHOUT REsPoNsmLrrY TO ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNERS.

-Plaintiff sued to recover damages for injuries to his property resulting from changing the grade of a street upon which the plaintiff was an
abutting owner. The injury was apparently consequential. It was
admitted that in making the improvement, the city was establishing
the original grade of the street. Held, that municipal corporations are
not liable for the establishment of the original street grade, but if the
grade, once established, is changed, then the municipality is liable,
under section 242 of the Constitution. Pursiful v. City of Harlan, et al.,
022 Ky. 658, 1 (2nd) S. W. 1043.
Section 242 of the Kentucky Constitution provides that: "Muncipal
corporations, and other corporations, and individuals invested with the
privilege of taking private property for public use, shall make just
compensation for property taken, injured, or destroyed by them." Prior
to its adojtion In 1891, It was the accepted rule in Kentucky that municipalities, acting under legislative authority to make, repair, and level
streets, were not in any case liable to the abutting owners if they kept
within the limits of the street, and did not actually trespass or Invade
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private property.

Keasy v. City of Louisville, 4 Dana 154; Bridge Co.

v. Foots, 9 Bush 264; Wolfe v. Railroad, 15 B. Mon. 323. But under
Section 242 of the present Constitution, the Court of Appeals has held
that It was the intentidi of the framers to change the organic law, and
to abolish the requirement of direct physical injury to property in order,
to, establish a claim for damages. City of Henderson v. McClain, 102
Ky. 402, 43 S. W. 700. Since that case, in an unbroken line of decisions,
it has been held that municipal corporations are liable for consequential injuries to abutting property owners from changing the established
grade of a street. City of Ludlow v. Detwefler, 47 S. W. (Ky.) 881;
City of Louisville v. Lansberg, 161, Ky. 361, 170 S. W. 962; City of Erlanger v. Cody, 158 Ky. 625, 166 S. W. 202.
However, there is a distinetion between the right of abutting owners where no grade has been previously fixed, and where one has already
been made and is changed. The reason for this is that'in the former
case the owner is presumed to have been compensated for injury done
by proper grading when he accepted the price for the dedicated strip.
-city of Owensboro v. Hope, 128 Ky. 524, 108 S. W. 873. It is therefore
the well accepted rule that a city is not liable for consequential damages to abutting property in the establishment of the original grade.
Gernert v. City of Louisville, 155 Ky. 589, 159 S. W. 116a; City of Somerset v. Carver, 221 Ky. 552, 299 S. W. 191.
At common law a muilcipal corporation is not liable for injuries
to private property resulting from a change of the grade of a highway,
unless negligently or unskillfully done. Smith v. Alexandriaj 33 Gratt.
(Va.) 208; Steinmann v. Ormond, 199 N. Y. Supp. 738. Damages are
thereby created solely by charter, statute, or constitution. People v.
Stillings, 119 N. Y. Supp. 298, affirmed in 200 N. Y. 525, 93 N. E. 1128.
The Missouri Constitution of 1875, Article 2, Section 21, has a
similar provision to that of Kenfucky's Constitution found in Section
242. Under it the Missouri courts have unifornly held the municipalities liable for consequential injuries in changing a street grade. Householder v. Kansas City, 83 Missouri 488. Prior to the adoption of this
section there was no liability in such a case. Swenson v. Lexington,
69 Mo. 157. In other states where similar provisions are found in statute, constitution, or charter, the rule is the same as in Kentucky and
Missouri. Montgomery v. Maddox, 89 Ala. 181, 7 So. 433; Bloomington
v. Pollock, 141 Ill. 346, 31 N. E. 146; People v. Green, 64 N. Y. 606.
1 It is submitted that the Kentucky rule is sound both upon'prlnciple
and authority.
W. c. S.
GAS-'AILmuR To INsTnuCr THAT ItEmoVAL or LEVER or GAS ItEGULATOR WAS WILLFUL OR WANTON ACT o' TnESPAssEu ron WHIcH DYFENDANT COAL ComPANY WAS NOT LABLE HELD NOT Entuou.-The plaintiff left a gas stove burning in her residence, and during the night the
gas was cut off. The next morning pressure was restored and plaintiff
became Ill from gas fumes. The regulator -which controlled the flow of
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gas into plaintiff's residence was left unguarded, and anyone could
regulate it by manipulaion of a lever. The defendant insisted that
the fact that a scantling had been laid across the lever -indicated that
someone, in endeavoring to increase the pressure had cut off the supply, and that this was a willful act of a trespasser for which the company should not be liable. Held, that the plaintiff should recover, and
that he court did not err in failing to instruct as to 'defendant's nonliability for willful act of trespasser where there was no evidence to
indicate such a willful or wanton act. Standard Elkhorn Coal Co. v.
Davis, 222 Ky. 773, 2 S. W. (2nd) 670.
This decision is based on the well-established rule that instructions
should state the law applicable to the particular facts which the evidence tends to prove -and with reference thereto, and not mere abstract,
propositions of law. Moses v. Lockwood, 54 App. D. C. 115, 295 Fed.
936; Chaney v. Moore, 101 W. Va. 621, 134 S. E. 204. Where instructions are given on any phase of a case the jury presumes that there was
evidence to support a verdict on that instruction. Since the abolition
of the scintilla 'doctrine an instruction ought not to be given when 'the
evidence on which it is based is insufficient to sustain a verdict. American Locomotive Co. v. Whitlock, 109 Va. 238, 63 S. . 991.
In the case of Louisville Gas Co. v. Gutcnkuntz, 82 Ky. 432, defendant sent an agent to turn off as from plaintiff's premises. He
did so with a key, leaving it in the box for about ten minutes. Plaintiff
was Injured by escape of gas. It was held that there was not sufficient
evidence to support an instruction as to non-liability of defendant for
willful act of a trespasser; that although the flow of gas may' have.
been caised by some other person turning the key while the employee
was out, still defendant was liable for employee's negligence in leaving
the key.
The decision in the principal case seems in accord with this hiolding and the general doctrine of a gas company's liability. The negliV
gence of the company in leaving the regulator unguarded was the proz
]mate cause of the injury, and the concurrent negligence of a third
person does not relieve the company from liability. Brown v. Kansas
Natural Gas Co., 299 Fed. 463; United States Natural Gas Co. v. Hicks,
134 Ky. 13, 119 S. W. 166.
In view of these decisions it seems evident that the circumstantial
evidence in the principal case would not support a verdict based on
such instruction as was asked, and that it was correctly refused. Other
cases holding an Instruction qorrectly refused when not based on the
evidence are: Bell's Admr. v. Louisville Ry. Co., 148 Ky. 189, 146 S.
W. 383; Adams Express Co. v. Hibbard, 145 Ky. 818, 141 S. W. 397;
MIller v. Neale, 137 Wis. 426, 119 N. W. 94.
E. T.

HOMICIDE-PERMITTING COMMONWEALT3
OF ALL EVIDENCE OF COnONEn'S

TO INTRODUCE TRANSCRO4

IN.QUEST HELD ERaonEous.-Defendant

was accused of murder and at the coroner's inquest a stenographic re-
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port of all evidence was taken. At the trial defendant sought to contradict the testimony of certain witnesses given at the inquest; whereupon the court over the defendant's objection permitted the commonwealth to introduce a transcript of all the evidence given at the inquest.
Held: Permitting commonwealth to introduce a transcript of all evidence of coroner's inquest was erroneous. Canterbury v. Commonwealth, 222 Ky. 510, 1 (2nd) S. W. 976.
Wigmore, Vol. III, Sec. 1374, in discussing the status of testimony
taken at a coroner's inquest says, "In the United States the proper conclusion has been reached that the lack of cross-examination as an element in the coroner's procedure makes such testimony inadmissible."
It is a fundamental principle of our law that every person accused
of a crime is entitled to meet his accuser, face to face in open court,
and have an opportunity for cross-examination. Where this is done
our courts have allowed testimony given at the examination of the
accused to be introduced provided the witnesses cannot be found upon
diligent search. People v. Shepps, 186 N. W. 508, 21 A. L. R. 658;
People v. Mascz, 226 Mich. 187, 197 N. W. 542. However, the same jurisdiction has declared that since an inquest is held without an accusation of crime the testimony there given could not be introduced as substantive proof at the trial. People v. Dewitt, 233 Mich. 222, 206 N. W.
562. The West Virginia court has likewise held that a coroner's verdict
is not proper evidence and therefore should not be admitted at the trial.
State v. McCausland, 82 W. Va. 525, 96 S. E. 938.
Some courts have held that where the accused voluntarily makes
statements at the coroner's inquest, they may be introduced agains'.
him at the trial. Under these circumstances, however, there Is no
necessity for the above mentioned safeguard. Regan v. People, 49 Colo.
316, 112 P. 785; Moki v. People, 18 Wyo. 481, 112 P. 334. The New York
court has modified this doctrine somewhat by saying that if a party is
not accused at the time of the Inquest, statements made by him may be
introduced as evidence at the trial. People v. StroZlo, 191 N. Y. 142,
83 N. E. 573; Pruett v. Commonwealth, 199 Ky. 35, 250 S. W. 131. However, some jurisdictions have held that even the accused's own statements voluntarily made at a coroner's inquest are not admissible at the
trial. People v. Heacoc,, 10 Cal. App. 45, 102 P. 543; Mullins v. Commonwealth, 113 Va .787, 75 S. E. 193.
Although from the above cited cases there is some doubt as to the
extent and purpose for which accused's own statements at an inquest
may be introduced at the trial, the courts seem agreed that statements
of witnesses given at the inquest cannot be introduced as evidence at
the trial, People v. Heacock, 10 Cal. App. 450, 102 P. 543; Dupree v.
State, 33 Ala. 380, 73 Am. Dec. 422; Sylvester v. State, 71 Ala. 17; State
v. Squires, 15 Idaho 545, 98 P. 413; McLain v. Commonwealth, 99 Pa.
86; State v. CampDell, 1 Rich. Law (S. C.) 124.
Unless the accused was given the right of cross-examination at the
trial and the witnesses are proved to be beyond the jurisdiction of the
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court at the time of trial, the testimony is inadmissible.

Hobbs Y. State,

53 Tex. Cr. R. 71, 112 S. W. 308.
In the instant case the court excluded the evidence with the simple
statement that Its admission was "manifest error," and in view of the
"best evidence rule" this seems sufficient because from the record it
does not appear that the witnesses, whose testimony was sought to be
introduced, were not present at the trial. However, from the cases
cited we must conclude that the court is in accord with the overwhelmIng weight of authority in excluding the proffered testimony. J. C. B.

INSuRANCE-DIRECTED

VERDICT

FOR INSURER

IN

SUIT ON

ACCIDENT

POLICY HELD EEROIR AS QUESTION WHETHER SHOOTING WAS ACCIDENTAL

WAS FOR THE JuRY.-The appellee issued to appellant's husband a policy
Insuring him against bodily injury caused by accidents. According to
the terms of the policy, the injury must be due solely to external, violent and involuntary causes. The facts showed that the injury occurred while insured was scuffling over a pistol. He died in three or
four JVours as a result of the wound. At the conclusion of the evidence,
the lower court instructed the jury to return a verdict for the appellee.
Held: The lower court erred in directing a verdict for appellee as it
was a question for the jury .o determine whether the shooting was
accidental. Davis v. Massachusetts Protective Association, 223 Ky. 626,
4 (2nd) S. W. 398.
This case is in accord with earlier cases in Kentucky. In an action
on an accident insurance policy it was held that under the evidence the
manner in which the plaintiff was injured was a question for the jury.
Aetna Life Insurance Company v. Crabtree, 146 Ky. 368, 142 S. W. 690.
Whether the insured's death was caused by a fall downstairs or pneumonia contracted thereafter was also held to be a question for the jury
in National Life and Accident Insurance Company v. Coo, 174 Ky. 683,
192 S. W. 636. Other Kentucky cases which express the same view:
Hill's Adm'x. v. North American Accident Insurance Company, 185 Ky.
520, 215 S. W. 428. Also, Cotton States Life Insurance v. Spencer, 220
Ky,. 536, 295 S. W. 861.
This same rule prevails in other jurisdictions as the better view.
In Nerrow v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company of Californiacited
in 294 S. W. 97 (a Missouri case) the same question was raised and
decided the same as in the present case. Also in Mulvihill v. Commercial Casualty Insurance Company 224 N. Y. S. 644; Newsoms v. Commercial Casualty Insurance Company, 147 Va. 471, 137 S. B. 456;
Borosich v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 194 Wis. 15, 215 N.
W. 575.
In conclusion it is clear that the holding in the case before us is
in accord with the cases previously decided in Kentucky. It is also in
G. C. R.
accord with the majority rule in other jurisdictions.
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INsunNcE--FmE PoLiciEs WILL NOT IN TazMESLvs ETiTLE INSURER TO SUBROGATION TO RIGHTS Or PaoPzRTY OwINER AGAINST WAMn2
CompANY WHERE WATER COmPANY WAS NOT A PARTY.-Plalntiffs are the

insured and the insurer and they are seeking damages for a failure of
water company to supply sufficient water pressure as it had contracted
to do in its franchise with the city; whereby the Insured, a citizen of
the city lost a building by fire. The insurer has pah the full amount
of its debt and is seeking to be subrogated to the rights of the insured
against the water company. Held: (1) that an insurance company will
not be entitled to subrogation when the fire was not caused by the
defendant; (2) that the insurance company was not a party to the contract providing for subrogation therefore the contract 'is not a ground
for holding the ,water company liable; (3) that to allow an application
of subrogation here would be contrary to public policy since if the
water companies had to bear such burdens they would have to raise the
"ates and this would be detrimental to the public good. Bufford & Company, et al. v. Glasco Water Company, 223 Ky. 54, 2 S. W. (2nd), 1027.
The opinion does not disclose on which of these grounds the court
bases its decision, probably that of public policy, at least that argument
is more convincing. The final results, however, are In: accord with the
majority view.
Upon the first argument the court held that the water company
was liable to the Individual citizen on its contract with the city, as
laid down in Paducah Lwmber Company v. Paducah Water Supply Company, 89 Ky. 340, 12 S. W. 554. It Is upon this ground chiefly.that the
Kentucky courts differ from other courts. The majority view is that
the individual user does not have a cause of action because there Is nc
privity, and therefore, there can be no right to subrogation if the insured himself had no action. German Alliance Insurance Company v.
Home Water Company, 174 Fed. 764, 33 Supreme Court 32; Brown v.
Somerville Water Company, 84 N. J. Law 611, 87 AtI. 140.
the Kentucky courts hold that such right exists but will not extend
it to the insurer because the water company has not committed any tort
against the insured. This is a much narrower view than Is taken by
most courts. It is generally held that the right of subrogation extends
to all the rights of the insured arising out of the wrong of a third party.
Phoenix Insurance Company of Brooklyn v. Erie & Western Transportation Company, 117 U. S. Supreme Court Reporter 873; Regen v. N. Y. &
Eastern Railway Company, 60 Conn. 124, 22 At. 503; Spaudling v.
Harvey, 129 Ind. 106, 28 Am. State Rep. 176.
The second argument set forth by the court is that since the debt
owing by the wrong doer is in no way connected with the obligation of
the insurer there is not sufficient relation to support the action, and
the insurer will not be paying the debt of the wrong doer. There seems
to be no direct authority on this point in other cases. Harnsbergerv.
Yancy, 33 Gratt. (Va.) 527; Johnson v. Barrett, 117 Ind. 551.
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The third argument of the court disregards the usual purpose for
which subrogation is applied. In one sentence the court said; "Subrogation is of equitable origin and was devised for the purpose of doing
justice between the parties concerned." The court later said that since
insured has recovered there should be no attempt to hold the water
company. This is not very favorable to the inturer who has borne the
loss of the water company's negligence when it is clearly, primarily
liable. The court in effect holds that the insurer must bear the loss
becau.-e it has contracted to do so, or to do otherwise might be detrimental to the public good because it would require a raise in rates.
This seems to be contrary to the rule laid down in Illinois Central
Railway Company v. Hickin, 131 Ky. 624, 115 S. W. 752.
The final reult cannot be criticized since it is in accord with the
majority rule. The general rule is that the insurer cannot be subrogated since the insured has no right, therefore, the insurer can have
hOre Phoenix Insurance Company v. Trenton Water Company, 42 Mo.
Appeals 118. The Kentucky court holds that the individual has a right,
but that of itself will not allow the insurer to be subrogated to such
right. The court does not intimate just what would enable the insurer
to exercise this right.
W. H. C.

LOST INSTRUMENTS-IN SUING ON LOST NOT, PLAINTIFF MUST ALIG:G PACITS IN EFFECT THAT Loss WAS BROUGHT ABOUT WITHOUT FRAUD
ON PLAINTIFF'S PARrT.-Plaintiff was the payee of a promissory, note,
made by, and payable by the defendant. Plaintiff gave the note to a
friend, the president of a bank, to keep for him. The president lost
the note. The plaintiff failed to state in his petition that the nate was
lost without fraud on his part. To this the defendant demurred. The
court overruled the demurrer and the defendant filed an answer and
p~oceeded to trial. Upon a verdict for the plaintiff, defendant asked
for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the motion was upheld,
and the petition dismisseff. The plaintiff appeals. The Court of Appeals held that verdict cured the defect in the petition and entitled the
plaintiff to a judgment in accord with the verdict. Crawford V. Crawford, 222 Ky. 708, 2 S. W. (2nd), 401.
The question involved in this case is purely a matter of pleading
and practice. Section 7 of the Civil Code requires that a person suing
on a lost note must allege and prove that the note was lost without
fraud on his part, and upon failure to so allege the petition is demurable. Hoyland v. NationalBank of Middlesboro, 137 Ky. 682, 126 S. W.
356. But the lower court having refused to uphold the demurrer, and
having proceeded to a verdict, the verdict cures the defect. This view
is In accord with Civil Code, section 134, and is in keeping with Kimborough v. Lexington City National Bank, 150 Ky. 336, 150 S. W. 323;
and also U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Go. v. Trustee, Baptist Church
of Columbus, 31 Ky. Law Reporter 520, 102 S. W. 325 and Bell v. MoUl
and 0. Ru. Co., 71 U. S. 598, 18 Law Ed. 338.
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There seems to be little authority on this boint from other states.
A thorough search has revealed no other state with a similar statute or
code provision. However, there are two states which hold directly
contra, though, there was no statute involved. In Storey v. Kerr, 89 N.
W. 601, 2 Neb. 568, the court held that it was not necessary to allege the
manner of the loss since that was only a matter of secondary evidence.
In Thomas v. AcCormick, 1 N. Mexico 369, the same view was taken.
From an examination of the authorities it Is very evident that the
Kentucky rule, as based on the Civil Code, section 7, is not In accord
with the weight of authority. In Kentucky it is necessary to aver that
the note was lost withouit fraud on the part of the plaintiff. In other
states such is a matter of secondary evidence to establish the fact of
the loss.
W. H. C.
MASTER AND SERVANT-SECTION HAND UNDER 16 YEARS OLD INJuRED
WHILE

CRAWLING UNDER TRAIN

HELD NOT PRECLUDED FROM. RECOVERY

UNDER FEDERAL STATUTE ON GROUND OF IMPROPER, UNNECESSARY,

AND UN-

AUTHORIZED USE OF PREMISES (KY. ST., SEC. 331A9)-FEDERAL EmPLoYERS'
LIABILITY ACT (45 U. S. C. A., SEC. 5159).-Appellee, a boy 15 years old

had been in the employ of the appellant for a period of nine months as
a section hand. It was part of appellee's duty to carry water from a
spring located across the tracks of the appellant. Appellee was engaged
in carrying water at the time of the Injury complained of. He was in
the act of crawling under a freight train, when the engineer started
the train, catching appellee under it and inflicting severe injuries. No
one knew that appellee was under the train. Held, that appellee was
entitled to recover under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (45
U. S. C. A., sections 51-59), and that the act of the Kentucky Legislature (Ky. Stats., section 331a-9), fixing liability was not in conflict with
the Federal statute. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Go. v. Stapleton's Guardian, 223 Ky. 154, 3 (2nd) S. W. 209.
The Kentucky statute forbids the employment of children under
16 years of age, and a violation of the statute is negligence (Ky. Stats.,
section 331a-9). Such a statute is not in conflict with the Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 U. S. C. A., sections 51-59), which precludes
from recovery on grounds of improper, unnecessary, and unauthorized
use of premises. Frese v. Chicago, Burlington d- Quincy Ry. Co., 263 U.
S. 1, 44 S. Ct. 1, 68 L. Ed. 131.
The Federal Employers' Iiability Act (U. S. Comp. Stats., sections
8657-8665) erects no standard of what shall constitute negligence, but
this is to be determined by the law of the jurisdiction. Woods v Chicago B. & Q. B. Co., 137 N. E. 806. But in cases under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (U. S. Comp. Stats., sections 8657-8665), questions
of the injured servant's or defendant employer's negligence in connection with the injury are controlled by the principles delivered by the
federal rather than the state courts. Kalaskian v. Hines, 171 Wis. 429,
177 N. W. 602.
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Where the provisions of a federal statute actually cover any point,
whether it is one of substantive law or practice or procedure, the state
L. R. A.
statute Is'superseded, and the federal statute alone controls.
1915C. 52. It can be seen that this does not conflict with the Kentucky
decision, however.
regardless of the decisions to the contrary it appears that the Kentucky rule is in conformity with the Federal Statute. It is stated in
the principal opinion that the Federal Employers' Liability Act does
not undertake to define negligence, and that therefore there appears no
H. C. C.
reason why it should supersede section 331a-9 Ky. Stats.

MORTGAGES-RECORDED

PURCHASE

IONY

AuToMonmIt HELD SUPERIOR TO SUBSEQUENT

CHATTEL

MORTGAGE

ON

STATUTORY LiEx- FOR LAnon

asserted a statutory lien dn an automobile
for labor and accessories. The defendant asserted a prior, recorded
purchase money mortgage on the same automobile. Held, that where a
purchase-money mortgage is recorded prior to the adquiring of a statutory lien for labor and accessories, the recorded purchase money mortgage is superior to the statutory lien. Indiana Truck Corporation of
Kentucky v. Hurry Up Broadway Co., 222 Ky. 527, 1 (2nd) S. W. 990.
As is pointed out by the court the case depends upon'the construction of the statute which created the lien, Ky. Statutes 2739h-1, 2739h-2.
In the first consideration the court interprets the statute in the light of
the law in force at the time of its enactment. This interprdtation makes
It consistent with prior statutes to the effect that a deed or deed of trust
or mortgage shall take effect when recorded, Kentucky Statutes, Sections
496 and 497. The general rule as to liens is that, in the absence of
etatutory regulation to the contrary, a lien which is prior in time gives
a prior claim, Rankin v. Scott, 6"U. S. (L. Ed.) 592; Howard v. Milwaukee and St. Paul Railroad Co., 25 U. S. (L. Ed.) 1081. It was in following this rule that the court arrived at the conclusion that since
there was nothing in the statute creating the lien for labor and accessories which gave it- a prior right to other liens, then the lien created
by the recorded mortgage being prior in time must confer a prior claim
and is entitled to satisfaction, out .of the subject matter it binds, before
the subsequent statutory lien for labor and accessories binding the
R. M. 0.
same property.
A1SD Accrssoni.-Plaintiff

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-CITY OPER.ATING STREET MATERTAL QUARRY
HELD ENGAGED IN

GOVERNAIENTAL FUNCTION, PRECLUDING

LIABuIrrY

Pon

SERVANTS' NEGLIGENCE IN STORING'DYNAM1ITE FOUND BY CHILD LICENSEEL

-The city, appellee, maintained and operated a quarry for the purpose
of furnishing material to be used on the city streets. A child licensee,
while at city quarry, found dynamite caps which he took and later gave.
to another child, appellant, who vas injured by the explosion of one of
these caps. The servants of the city who were in charge of the dyna-
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mite. did not take the necessary and due precaution to guard against
their being taken by sbme child. Suit was brought against the city for
the injury caused by the negligence of its servants. Held, that a city
was not liable for any negligence of Its servants in the operation of the
quarry.since it was a governmental function. White v. City of Hopkinsville, 222 Ky. 664, 1 (2nd) S. W. 1068.
The immunity of a municipality from liability for negligence in the
performance of a governmental function is an old and well-6stablished
rule. Schwalk's Administrator v. City of Louisville, 135 Ky. 570, 122
S. W. 860; Kippes v. City of Louisville, 140 Ky. 423, 131 S. W. 184; City
of Bowling Green v. Bandy, 208 Ky. 259, 270 S. W. 837; Edson v. City
of Olathe, 82 Kans. 4, 107 P. 539.
An exception to this rule is where in the maintenance of streets
within the municipality, although consisting of the performance of
public duties and governmental functions, the city is liable for negligence in failing to maintain them in a reasonably safe condition.
Braunstein v. City of Louisville, 146 Ky. 777, 143 S. W. 372; Snida v. City
of St. Paul, 51 Minn. 466, 53 N. W. 763. The court places this case
under the general rule and not under the exception on the ground that
injury was due to negligence in storing dynamite which could not come
under the narrow confines of the exception which deals exclusively with
injuries due to unsafe conditions of the streets.
It is an equally well-established exception to the rulethat where a
municipality performs a duty for its strictly private benefit, the function is said to be ministerial and the rule of immunity does not apply.
Smith's Administrator v. Commissioners of Sewerage of Louisvilge, 146
Ky. 562, 143 S. W. 3; City of Pas Christian v. Pernandy, 100 Miss. 76,
56 So. 329; Johnson v City of Chicago, 258 Ill. 493, 101 N. E. 980. The
court, in holding that this case did not come under thid exception, follo-wed the inajority rule. Colwell v. City of Waterbury, 74 Conn. 568, 51
Atl. 690; Irvine v. Town of Greenwood, 89 S. C. 511, 72 S. E. 228.
R. M- 0.
WHO RAMLS TO OBSERVE OBVIOUR
NEGLIGEwNCE-GuEST IN AUTO mOBILu
DANGERS On TO WARN DRIvEn THEREOF IS GULTY OF CoNTRmiuToay NEGLi.GNCF-An automobile while being driven by its owner was struck
by a train at a grade crossing on a public road. At the time of the accident another person was riding in the automobile as the owner's
guest. Both the owner and his guest were killed. The administratrix
of the guest brought an action to recover damages for the guest's death.
Held, that since the guest did not exercise ordinary care for his own
safety in approaching the crossing, no recovery could be had against
ther estate of the driver. Stephenson's Administratrix v. Sharp's Executors et al., 222 %Ky.496, 1 S. W. (2nd) 957.
It is the duty of one riding In a machine on approaching a railroad crossing at grade to use ordinary care to avoid injury to himself,
even though a guest. Barksdale, Administrator v. Southern Railway
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Co., 199 Ky. 592, 251 S. W. 656. While one riding in a vehicle as the
guest or-by invitation of another is not responsible for the negligence
of the latter, yet the guest is not relieved from exercising ordinary care for his own safety in approaching the crossing. Milner's Administrator
v. Bvansville Railways Co., 188 Ky. 14, 221 S. W. 207. Under the circumstances in the principal case, the duty of the guest is well stated
by .the court in Davis v. Chicago, B. L & P. By. Co., 159 Fed. 18, 88 C.
C. A. 496, where the court said: "It is now the better recognized rule of
law that as to such a person situated as was, the plaintiff, riding In a
vehicle in mere companionship with his friend, engaged upon a mutual
adventure, it is as much his duty as that of the driver to take observation of dangers, and to avoid them, if practicable, by suggestion and
protest In other words, he is required to exercsie ordinary care to
avoid injury." If the guest is cognizant of danger resulting in injury,
and fails to call the driver's attention to it, but permits him to drive
recklessly into it without protest on his part, no recovery can be had.
Cunningham v. Thief River FaZls, 84 Minn. 21, 86 N. W. 763. A guest in
an automobile is guilty of contributory negligence, as against the
driver, where riding in mere companionship with him and failing to
take observation of dangers and to avoid them by suggestion and protest, the alleged negligence being dangerous speed. Lavine v. Abramson, 142 Md. 222, 120 Atl. 523. An invitee, a gratuitous passenger or
gudst, riding in an automobile driven by the owner at an obviously
dangerous speed, must exercise ordinary care for their own safety, and,
if they fail to warn the driver and do not take any precautions for their
own safety, they are guilty of contributory negligence and cannot recover for injuries resulting therefrom due to the negligent operation of
the car by the driver. Glick v. Baer, et al., 186 Wis. 268, 201 N. W. 752;
Naglo v. Jones, 115 Kan. 140, 222 Pac. 116; Wagenbauer v. Schwinn, 285
Pa. 128, 131 Atl. 699; Knoxville Railway & Light Co. v. Vangilder, 132
Tenn. 489, 178 S. W. 1117; Sheehan v. Coffey, 200 N. Y. Supp. 55; Irvine
v. McDougal, (Mo.) 274 S. W. 923; Rogers v. Ziegler, (Ohio) 152 N. E.
781; Vicora v. Cerveri, (Nev.) 244 Pac. 897.
The doctrine of the cases cited is not that the negligence of the
driver is imputed to his guest, but that it is also the duty of the guest
to exercise ordinary care for his own safety. Unkdoubtedly it is a sound
rule to hold, that a passenger, the guest in an automobile operated by
another, is bound to exercise reasonable care for his own safety, and
that a failure to do so constitutes contributory negligence and bars
recovery against the owner for injury resulting, in part, from the
B. C.
operator's negligence.
SUNDAY-WHERE

BRoKER's CONTRACT REGARDING EXCHANGE OF FARM

WAS EXECUTED ON SVNDAY, IT WAS NONENFORCEADLE, NO RATIFIoATION B.

nGa SHOWN. (Kentucky Statutes, Section 1321).-Plaintiff met defendant at plaintiff's office on Sunday and defendant addressed and signed
a letter to plaintiff by which he proposed to exchange the land owned
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by him for two houses owned by J. on condition that the offer be accepted in one day by J. The letter also contained the agreement between defendant and plaintiff as to what was to be the commission.
Plaintiff brought this action to recover his commission. Defendant
pleaded that the contract under which plaintiff sought to recover was
executed on Sunday. Held: The contract was nonenforceable. Hofgesang v. Silver, 223 Ky. 101, 3 S. W. (2nd) 185.
At common law, ihere is no doubt but that plaintiff could have
recovered, because under the common law all business other than judicial proceedings could be lawfully transacted on Sunday. Heisin v.
Smith, 138 Cal. 46, 71 Pac. 180; Ward v. Warfd, 75 Minn. 269, 77 N. W.
965. This doctrine, however, has been changed in the various jurisdictions by statutes differing somewhat in phraseology but having the
same purpose. These statutes prohibit the performance of work and
labor in one's "ordinary calling" on the Sabbath. "Ordinary calling"
means that which the ordinary duties of the calling bring into continued action. Reed v. State, 19 Ga. 562, 46 S. E. 837; Rem v. Whitnash,
7 B. & C. 596In Kentucky the common law rule was changed by Section 1321 of
Carroll's Kentucky Statutes which provides that no work or business
shall be done on the Sabbath day, except the ordinary household offices,
or other work of necessity or charity, or work required in the maintenance or operation of a ferry, skiff or steamboat, or steam or street railroad.
It is clear that plaintiff was not engaged in a work of necessity or
charity. He was acting within the ordinary calling of his work. He
was a real estate broker, and at the time this contract was made he
was at his own office. There is no reason whatsoever why plaintiff
should recover under the statute. Also, defendant never ratified or accepted the benefits of the services rendered by plaintiff. He refused to
carry out the contract to exchange with J. Had defendant accepted the
benefits, there would be no question but that plaintiff could recover.
Rosa V. Oliver Bros. & Honeycutt, 152 Ky. 437, 153 S. W. 756; Campbell
v. Young, 72 Ky. 240; Bertram v. Morgan, 173 Ky. 655 191 S. W. 317.
The courts have fully defined a work of necessity. A work of necessity is not a physical or absolute necessity but a work of a moral
fitness or propriety of the work and labor done under the circumstances
of each particular case. Johnson v. People, 31 Ill. 469; MeClary v.
Lowell, 44 Vt. 116, 8 Am. Rep. 366. The work done must be for the
public safety and .good. Such work would include furnishing food,
wvater, and artificial light, the feeding and care of animals, and acts
to secure public safety, etc. Turner v. State, 85 Ark. 188, 107 S. W. 388.
The general rule followed in most of the jurisdictions is: where
two parties execute a contract on Sunday, It is valid unless made void
by statute. But if the contract is made on Sunday, and it is necessary
in order to completely perform the contract for one party to act on a
secular day, the contract will be valid and will be enforced by courts.
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It is only where the contract is completely performed on Sunday that it
is made void. Hill v. Dunham, 7 Gray (Mass.) 543; Farrowv. Arnold,
22 R. I. 305, 47 A. 693; Cross v. Bank of Eusley, 203 Ala. 561, 84 So. 267.
The Supreme Court of the United States in Gibbs and Sterrett Mfg.
Co. v. Brucker, 111 U. S. 597, expressed its view in regard to Sunday
contracts. This case arose in Wisconsin where a statute made It penal
to do any manner of business on Sunday. Revised Statutes, 1878, S.
4595. A contract was signed by one of the parties on Sunday and
delivered to the second party's agent. The second party assented and
signed on a week day. Held: The contract was valid. The court stated
in its dicta that if the second.party had signed on Sunday the contract
would have been void.
The Supreme Court rule.has never been overruled. Consequently
through a thorough search of the authorities, it can be seen that both
the states and the Supreme Court hold that the doctrine that contracts
made on Sunday are void depends alone on statutes of the various
W. C. W.
states.
TAXATION-COM1PANY

E NGAGED

IN

BLASTING,

ING RocK FOR RoADs, HELD "MANUFACTURING"

CRUSHING AND DELIVERWITHIN

THE

EXEMPTION

STATUTE (Ky. Stats., Sec. 40, 19a-10) .- Rock was blasted from its native
place, broken into sizes small enough to be placed in a crusher, then
crushed into sizes ranging from ordinary stones to macadam chips.
According to Kentucky Statutes Sec. 4016a-10 "Machinery and products
in course of manufacture of persons, firms or corporations actually engaged in manufacturing and their raw material actually on hand at
their plants for the purpose of manufacture" are 3xempt from local
taxation. Held, this case came within the statute, Commonwealth for
u.e of Rockcastle County v. W. J. Sparks Compavy, 222 Ky. 606, 1 (2nd)
S. W. 1050.
A company was engaged in assembling buggies. The parts were
ibnj bt aiready manufactured. Held, this was manufacturing withi-l
the above mentioned statute in City of Henderson v. George Delker Co.,
193 Ky. 248, 235 S. W. 732. A company was engaged in roasting, cleaning and grinding coffee beans after which it was packed in containers
to be sold for domestic purposes. Held, manufacturing in Gity of Louisville v. Zinmeister and Sons, 188 Ky. 570, 222 S. W. 958. 'The court
said, "Whether it is such an establishment (manufacturing) does not
depend upon the size of the plant, the number of men employed, the
nature of the business or the articles to be manufactured, but upon all
these together and upon the result accomplished." This same conclusion was reached in the case of City of Louisville v. Louisville Tin and
Stove Company, 170 Ky. 577, 186 S. W. 124; and in Bogard v. Tyler,
119 Ky. 637, 55 S. W. 709, the court decided that an ordinary saw mill
was a manufacturing establishment. In Hall a~icl Son v. Guthrie's Sons,
Assignee, 31 Ky. Law Reports 801, 103 S. W. 721, it was held a flour
mill was a manufacturing establishment.
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This appears to be the view in other jurisdictions. H. H. Kholsaat
and Comp4ay v. O'Connell, 255 Illinois 271, 99 N. E 689; Commonwealth v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Company, 41 Pa. Co. CL 312;
Engle v. Sohn, 41 Ohio St. 691, 52 Arn. tiep. 103; In Re Simcox, 243
Federal "479.
The courts in interpreting the statutes in tax exemption cases
seem to look to the broader definitions of the word "manufacture" and
often limit the scope of general lexicographical definitions. The court
followed the broader interpretations of the word "manufacture" in this
case, and in so doing it followed the weight of authority.
G. C. R.

TAxAToN-FAcTs HLrD To SHow THAT DEFENDANT WAS RESJDEN2
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In FLORIDA, AND HENcE INTANGIBLES WEnE Nor TAxABLE nY K N cU .
-Defendant expressed his intention to remove to Florida and make it
his residence. He purchased a home in Florida, notified church and
2ounty officers and his business friends of his intentions, sold two farms
in Kentucky, and no longer voted in elections there. Held, that defedant was a resident of Florida and hence the state of Kentucky could
not assess certain intangible property to him for taxation, notwithstanding he spent more time In Kentucky than in Florida. Commonwealth v. Ott, 223 Ky. 612, 4 (2nd) S. W. 417,
Section 4020 of the Kentucky Statutes under which an attempt was
made to tax the present defendant, has been interpreted as follows:
"Under our Statute, See. 4020, all intangible personal property has a
situs for the purpose of taxation at the domicile only of the owner."
Sampson, J., in Millett's Executor v. Commonwealth, 184 Ky. 193, 211
S. W. 562. There is no conflict in Kentucky with respect to the interpretation given this part of the Statute and while the doctrine which
it represents, namely, that of mobilia sequuntur personam, has been
the subject of much discussion with regard to tangible personal property, it is well settled that it is not only expeditious but necessary to
apply it to cases involving intangibles. Tappan v. Merchants National
Bank, 19 Wall. 490; Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U. S. 491; Blackstone
v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189.
The real question In the principal case involves the meaning of the
word "domicile" or residence as it is more commonly known. Cooley,
in his work on Taxation, Volume I, page 641, says, "No exact definition
can be given of domicile; it depends upon no one fact or combination
of circumstances, but from the whole taken together it must be determined in each particular case. It is a maxim that every man must
have a domicile somewhere, and also that- he can have but one. Of
course it follows that his existing domicile continues until he acquires
another, and vice versa, by acquiring a new domicile he relinquishes
his fopner one. From this view it Is manifest that very slight circumstances must often decide the question."

CASE CoMMs
In Hurst v. City of Flemingsbyrg, 172 Ky. 127, 188 S. W. 1085, the
court clearly states the Kentucky Rule as follows: "The question of
re~idence.is one of fact and intention. Both must concur./But where
a paity has an actual residence in two diferent states and spends a
substantial portion of his time in each, he may establish his residence
in either state, and neither the fact that his dwelling house in the other
state is more comfortable or better furnished, nor the fact that he
spends the greater portion of his time there, will be conclusive on the
question of residence." The following cases are to the same effect:
Robinson v. Paxton, 210 Ky. 575, 276 S. W. 500; City of Winchester v.
Van Meterl 158 Ky. 31, 164 S. W. 323; Semple v. Commonwealth, 181
Ky. 675, 205 S. W. 789; Millets' Ew'r v. Commonwealth, supra; -Boyd's
Ez'r v. Commonwealth, 149 Ky* 764, 149 S. W. 1022, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.)
580. It will also be found that the following additional authorities are
also of like effect: Ennis v. Smith, 14 Howard 400, 14 L. Ed. 398, 55
U. S. 472; People v. Moir, 207 Ill. 180, 69 N. E. 905; In re Newcomb,
192 N. Y. 238, 84 N. E. 950; Tally v. Commonwealth, 127 Va. 516, 103
S. E. 612.
It Is perfectly obvious that it is impossible to lay down any set
rule by which the question of domicile can be determined but as a
summary on this question, a part of the opinion In the case of Staiar's
Admr. v. Commonwealth, 194 Ky. 316, 239 S. W. 40, is pertinent.
There the court said, "The only principle that can be laid down as governing all questions of domicile is this, that where a party is alleged
to have abandoned his domicile of origin, and to have acquired a new
one, it is necessary to show that there was both the factum and the
animus. There must be the act, and there must be the intention. A
new domicile is not acquired until there is not only a fixed intention of
establishing a permanent residence in some other county but until
also this intention has been carried out by actual res10ence there."
In the instant case there was evidence of defendant's inteition to
change his domicile and also evidence of residence in the other state,
consequently the decision seems correct.
C. E. B.

